MCR circuits required to be hardwired?

cisco_kid

Member
Join Date
Feb 2007
Location
Portland, OR
Posts
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Regarding conveyor systems:

Our current design guidelines incorporate and Emergency Stop circuit to remove power to all output modules that control moving equipment. The PLC program is written to monitor the E. Stop circuit, among other things. An MCR is programmed, which must be reset using a START pushbutton following any stoppage, safety or other.

I was recently questioned by a new designer on whether or not it was wise to not use a hardwired MCR circuit. My interpretation of NFPA 79, 9.4.3.4.2 (2) would indicate that a programmable circuit is acceptable.

I read through a previous post in which there was much discussion of hard wired vs. programmable E. Stop circuit, but little discussion of the MCR circuit.

Any thoughts are appreciated.
 
I would use safety relays for all of the series pull stations, and anything classified as SAFETY. You need to start to categorize your safety elements, in order of importance.

In any system that I have been part of, all safety items are hardwired.

It is also standard practice for "safety purposes" to disable the output cards used in a process.

You might want to contact your safety rep at the co that you will be installing in. All companies must comply to basic standards, but there are also standards on top of standards....
 
Sorry, after re-reading your post, the MCR is not disabling your safety circuits, hopefully. Your Safety will be hardwired, and your MCR is completely compliant to be programmed.

There have been many circuits in my past projects that leave the MCR enabled, when an E-Stop has been generated, for example, Blow Moulding systems....You would not want the heaters to keep stopping and starting......

Sorry for the misleading post..
 
A word of warning, lets be very careful with our terminology here. Is the MCR functioning as an E-Stop? It was common not all that long ago to label the E-Stop relay as an MCR and that practice may still be in use among many machine builders.

If the MCR performs any kind of Emergency Stop function it should be hardwired or if a PLC is used it should be a safety PLC. A standard PLC should alway have a hardwired emergency stop if there is any kind of safety issues involved.
 
One problem that can occur with PLCs and hard wired e-stop circuits is how do you want the PLC to behave if an e-stop is operated? It is worth spending some time in deciding what you want the machine to do when the e-stop is operated and after a e-stop reset. Do you want it to start from where it stopped or carry out a recovery operation or go back to its datum?

If you don't get this bit right then it can cause machine damage and possibly create a hazard on the re-start.
 
OK, you just open a can of worms. But there are some guidlines from OSHA and other agensies.
First of all - E-stop circutry must be hardwired. No PLC actions are allowed via CPU logic in order to perform E-Stop actions. Normally you would wire your PLC output module's incoming power through MCR relay contact (MCR relay must be wired to E-stop circuit). You PLC still can perform the E-Stop logix, but it wouldn't be a primary anymore.
 
not if you require a category 1 stop
Directive 98/37/EC.
Emergency Stop
This is an action in an emergency,
which is defined to stop a process or
movement which would otherwise
have potentially hazardous consequences
(from EN 60204-1 Annex D).
Further, the following is defined in
9.2.5.4.2 of EN 60204-1:
Stopping
In addition to the requirements for
Stop (refer to 9.2.5.3), the following
requirements apply for an Emergency
Stop:
. This must have priority over all other
functions and operator actions in all
operating modes;
. The power to the machine drive
elements, that could result in a
potentially hazardous condition
or potentially hazardous conditions,
must be disconnected as quickly
as possible without creating other
hazards(e.g. using mechanical stopping
devices, that do not require
an external supply, using countercurrent
braking for stop Category 1);
. A reset may not initiate a restart.
Stopping in an emergency must either
be effective as a Category 0 or
Category 1 stop (refer to 9.2.2).
The stop Category in an emergency
must be defined as the result of the
risk evaluation for the particular
machine.
To technically implement Emergency
Stop corresponding to the recommended
application in the Foreword of EN
60204-1, either the requirements specified
in EN 60204-1 or in EN 954 and
IEC 61508 can be applied. EN 60204-1
Edition 4 specifies the implementation
predominantly using electromechanical
components.
The reason for this is that ¡°basic¡± (programmable)
electronic systems are not
sufficiently safe. By correctly applying
EN 954 - and if required IEC 61508 -
electronic and programmable electronic
components are functionally safe so
that they can also be used to implement
an Emergency Stop function for
all categories.
The Emergency Stop function specifications
will be updated with Edition 5
(this is expected in 2005). In the final
draft of 2004 (the final Edition was still
not available at the time that this document
when to print) the following
statement applies:
The Emergency Stop shall function
either as a Category 0 stop or as a
Category 1 stop (see 9.2.2). The choice
of the category of the Emergency Stop
depends on the results of a risk assessment
of the machine.
In addition to the requirements for
stop (see 9.2.5.3), the Emergency Stop
function has the following requirements:
.​
It shall override all other functions

and operations in all modes;
.​
Power to the machine actuators

that can cause a hazardous condition(
s) shall be either removed
immediately (stop Category 0) or
shall be controlled in such a way
to stop the hazardous motion as
quickly as possible (stop Category 1)
without creating other hazards;
.​
Reset shall not initiate a restart.

This new formulation means that there
are no longer any restrictions stating
that hard-wired, electromechanical
equipment must be used to implement
safety-related functions.
Devices for EMERGENCY SWITCHING-
OFF and EMERGENCY STOP
Devices that are used to stop equipment
and machinery in an emergency
must be provided at every operator
control location and also at other locations
where it may be necessary to initiate
a stop in an emergency (exception:
operator control stations which
are not connected through cables).
In order to fulfill the protective goals,
specified in EN 60204-1 as well as EN
418, the following requirements apply
for both functions (also refer to 10.7
in EN 60204-1):
. When the contacts switch, even when
briefly actuated, the command device
must positively latch.
. It is not permissible that the machine
can be restarted from a remote main
operator station without the hazard
having first been removed. The emergency
switching command must be
released locally in the form of a conscious
operator action.
 
val_99 wrote:

OK, you just open a can of worms. But there are some guidlines from OSHA and other agensies


Uh... can you give a reference for OSHA? I went through a E-Stop fire drill... on a conveyor system come to think of it... about six years ago and I couldn't find anything from OSHA that required an E-Stop. OSHA requires guarding and labeling; they actually don't have a lot to say about the electrical or controls system. At least, I didn't find anything specific at that time. Electrical is NFPA 71, and controls is NFPA 79. As well as the plethora of UL documents.

NFPA 79 is the most specific reference that I have (anybody have the CE requirements handy? I don't! ** Edit- thanks Mordred!). NFPA 79, Chapters 9-10 deal with Stop and E-Stop.

Chapter 9 requires that all machines have a Category 0 stop; a Category 0 stop is "an uncontrolled Stop that immediately removes power to the machine actuators." A Category 1 stop is "a controlled stop with power to the machine actuators available to achieve the stop then remove power when the stop is achieved."

Per NFPA 79

9.2.5.4.1.3, "The emergency stop shall function as either a Category 0 or Category 1 stop."

9.2.5.4.1.4, "Where a Category 0 stop is used for the emergency stop function, it shall have only hardwired electromechanical components.

Exception: An electronic (hardware or software) system as well as the communication network or link that complies with both 9.4.3 and 11.3.4 and is listed for Category 0 emergency stop function shall be permitted. The final removal of power shall be accomplished by means of electromechanical components."

9.2.5.4.1.5, "Where a Category 0 or a Category 1 stop is used for the emergency stop function, final removal of power to the machine actuators shall be ensured and shall be by means of electromechanical components. Where relays are used to accomplish a Category 0 emergency stop function, they shall be nonretentive relays."

Finally, when you read through NFPA 79, 9.2.5.3 requires that the machine have Category 0 stop. This is NOT called the "E-stop." E-Stop may be either Category 0 or Category 1, and if provided must be provided in accordance with the requirements of Paragraph 9.2.5.4, which I reproduced (in part) above.

Confused yet? <g!> I used to work with one of the guys who WROTE the last release of NFPA 79, and he would never give me a straight answer either.

Of course, I'm still providing an E-Stop. It's always hardwired- I've never had occasion to use any of the red controllers, although they are now permitted at least by NFPA 79. It always uses a safety relay that in turn uses a manual reset. If I have final elements like servos, motors on VFDs, etc. their line side power is wired through contactors (i.e., ahead of the drive or controller) that are opened when the safety relay opens.

This is a good topic- what other references do you guys use for safety functions?
 
Recently I was looking at a system using devicenet where they had a number of safety devices connected via communication. I questioned the safety factor of this because anyone working with computer controller devices knows the hazards that can occour with any of the million reasons for failure.

I've never adapted using computer controlls for safety, all devices hard wired however their status monitored by the PLC for HMI and fault logging.

In some cases id use the MCR but special application only.
 
Thanks for the replies so far.

It seems there is much confusion between E. Stop and MCR circuits.

In my way of thinking, the Emergency Stop circuit is used to prevent personel and equipment damage. The MCR is used to intentionally enable machine operation.

The hard wired emergency stop circuit and ESCR (E. Stop Control Relay) disables moving equipment and disables the programmed MCR circuit. (via loss of E stop input).

The E. Stop circuit must first be reset manually, which activates the ESCR, then the MCR circuit (software) may be enabled via the Start PB.

According to everything I have found, this is sufficient.
 
cisco_kid wrote:

The E. Stop circuit must first be reset manually, which activates the ESCR, then the MCR circuit (software) may be enabled via the Start PB.

According to everything I have found, this is sufficient.

Yup. I think that's the way that most of us do it.
 

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